A leaked government report has exposed serious flaws in the redevelopment of the Landsome Bowl Cultural Centre, including a rushed timeline, poor planning and a lack of proper oversight.
The 27-page draft paper suggests a project driven by political pressure rather than technical readiness with staff instructed to fast-track plans for completion in time for the 2024 Anguilla Summer Festival.
Despite concerns raised by senior engineers about the lack of consultation, design quality and funding clarity, the project moved ahead at speed, the report says.
It claims that the former government sidelined key departments, failed to meet essential design standards, and never sought critical approvals.
The document was compiled by the Building Section of the Department of Infrastructure under the Ministry of Infrastructure, Communication, Utilities and Housing and is dated 20 March, 2025.
Overview
In late 2023, the Executive Council directed the infrastructure department and ministry to prepare architectural and construction plans for the reconstruction of the cultural centre on its original site.
According to the report, the infrastructure ministry was to manage the project on behalf of the Ministry of Social Development, with funding coming entirely from external grants rather than the government.
The proposed redevelopment included constructing two new buildings – a stage building to the north for performance preparation, and a booth building to the south for vendors.
A security wall would enclose the entire structure and a new stage would be built as part of the stage building. The existing cultural centre was set for demolition to make way for the new development.
The design team was tasked with having plans ready in time for construction to be completed ahead of the 2024 Summer Festival, which left less than a year for full execution, the report says.
The infrastructure department’s chief engineer Bancroft Battick raised concerns about the rushed timeline, noting inadequate opportunity for proper site planning, design work and community consultation.
He advocated for prioritising secure funding and public engagement, but the project continued to target completion for the 2024 festival, the report says.
Design review and phase
In February 2024, draft plans for the cultural centre redevelopment were submitted to Claudius Gumbs, the infrastructure ministry’s director of housing and construction, for review.
A wider ministry review found the designs incomplete, lacking key elements such as topography, drainage, water storage, mechanical systems and building finishes, the draft document says.
Office space for the Department of Youth and Culture was also included in the second storey of the stage building without prior consultation.
Gumbs requested more time to consult stakeholders and revise the plans.
Approval was granted and revised stage building designs were approved by government ministers, but Gumbs’s request for more time to redesign the booth building was denied.
Plans had to be issued to contractors by 23 February, forcing the team to work extended hours, but despite ministers’ promise to explore compensation for the extra workload, no follow-up occurred, the report says.
Tendering and demolition process
On 23 February, 2024, draft plans for the reconstruction were sent to infrastructure minister Haydn Hughes to invite contractor bids.
The plans were marked for bidding purposes only, with revisions to follow for construction use.
The project team, and the infrastructure department and ministry were not involved in or consulted about the procurement process, the report says.
They were not shown the bidding documents, informed of the shortlist of contractors, or included in any related decisions, it adds.
The ministry was told that the project was funded entirely by a grant, with no government funds required. Their only role was to provide the draft plans.
The demolition of the existing Landsome Bowl Cultural Centre was also not managed by the project team or infrastructure ministry.
Staff were only asked to help the Department of Youth and Culture salvage reusable materials. No approval for demolition was granted by the Anguilla Building Board.
Project commencement
In the weeks following, the ministry was informed that Leeward Construction was awarded the stage building contract, and GT Construction the booth building contract.
The ministry was not involved in contract administration – including contract preparation, budgeting, meeting scheduling or minutes, the report says.
It adds that the ministry did not see initial communications between the funding partner and contractors, such as contracts or award letters.
At the first meeting with Dart, the funding partner and owner of Four Seasons Resort and Residences Anguilla, the ministry’s role was defined as project architect and engineer, providing technical consultancy.
Responsibilities included daily monitoring, approving submittals, issuing specifications, responding to requests for information, completing drawings during construction, and other technical support.
The team included project engineer Claudius Gumbs, project architects Daryl Richardson and Gregory Permuy, roads engineer Shaynis Connor, building inspector Cordell Niles, and electrical and HVAC specialist Kasseem Forde.
The project officially began on 8 March, 2024, with excavation based on the ministry’s site plan, but construction started before full planning permission and building permits were granted, the report says.
Planning permission was approved on 20 March – building permits followed for the stage building on 22 March and the booth building on 28 March.
Quality controls
The project team was actively involved in early construction stages, particularly inspecting foundations and supporting contractors, and on-site decisions about foundation changes were made collaboratively.
However, only two formal meetings occurred between the project team and contractors to discuss and resolve issues.
A notification system for concrete pours was set – initially two days but later shortened to one day – allowing inspections by engineers and inspectors.
Although record keeping was poor, faults were corrected and re-inspected, ensuring foundations met design specifications, the report says.
Concrete samples were taken for strength testing at seven, 14, and 28 days. Some samples were missed or mislabelled, but overall results met requirements, it adds.
An error occurred when 3,500 psi concrete was used instead of the specified 4,000 psi for the booth building’s first-floor slab, however, the issue was promptly corrected.
The report says that extended working hours and some major pours happened after hours, risking quality due to limited inspection.
In addition, some pours occurred without prior approval, including the booth building’s entrance roof slab.
Deviation from design plans
The report details several deviations from the approved design plans that occurred during construction
The booth building site was regraded before final design levels were issued, a procedural breach, though the project team accepted the changes without action.
The cistern size was reduced and reinforcement was halved without consulting the project engineer, done to stay within budget as the original bid plans excluded a cistern.
Concrete columns supporting the booth building roofs had insufficient concrete cover, violating building codes – a mesh and thicker render were agreed upon, but completion is unconfirmed, the report says.
Security gates and walls were built in incorrect locations without project team’s approval, blocking planned future expansions, the document says.
Similarly, the sewage treatment plant was constructed off-site from the approved location after the team’s involvement ended.
An architectural skylight was omitted during roof construction, and VIP booths had unauthorised structural changes affecting accessibility, the report continues.
Finally, the electrical design for separate metres per booth was not implemented, requiring costly corrections, the ministry adds.
Notable incidents
The report lists several other notable incidents that took place during the project.
Weekly Zoom meetings were held with the funding partner Dart, chaired and minuted by then minister of social development Dee-Ann Kentish-Rogers, it says.
However, poor meeting practices were noted – minutes were often delayed, incomplete or missing, with key concerns from the infrastructure ministry frequently omitted, the report claims.
The report alleges that the treatment of chief engineer Bancroft Battick who raised significant budget concerns was “deplorable” with one incident where he was “disrespectfully ridiculed”.
Project engineer Claudius Gumbs formally communicated construction issues to GT Construction but his technical advice was later challenged by infrastructure minister Haydn Hughes, the report says.
Despite warnings, critical concrete work proceeded prematurely, leading Gumbs to resign on 6 May, 2024, citing safety risks and lack of control.
In addition, payment approvals for contractors were signed off under exceptional circumstances during a project manager’s prolonged sick leave, the report says.
Lessons learned
The report lists nine lessons learned during the reconstruction of the Landsome Bowl Cultural Centre.
Firstly, the government must improve its management of grant-funded projects by establishing clear procedures for contract oversight, responsibility allocation, and enforcement, it says.
Grant-funded projects should follow national procurement rules to ensure transparency, value for money, and accountability in contractor selection and variation management.
Adequate planning time must be allowed to avoid rushed, error-prone designs and staff burnout, the document says.
It adds that all regulatory approvals must be obtained before construction begins, with government leading by example.
Project managers and technical staff must be supported, and not pressured to approve unverifiable payments.
Proper documentation and reporting systems are essential, even under time constraints, the report says.
Government ministers should not interfere with technical processes or take on administrative roles, nor should they visit sites without proper safety gear.
And finally, they should not enable activities that contradict or go against the advice of the technical staff.
